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I. Introduction 
 
Today’s global agrifood system is highly unsustainable. Problems exist with respect to carbon 
emissions, effluents, pesticide use, soil erosion and acidification, animal welfare, farm worker 
standards, and farmer incomes to name just a few. These problems have yet to be politically 
addressed with any degree of effectiveness. 
At the same time, private actors, especially transnational food corporations, have become key 
players in global agrifood governance (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Private food governance, 
today is a reality and exerts powerful influences on the sustainability of the global agrifood 
system. In consequence, science and politics urgently needs to gain a better understanding of 
the relationship between agrifood sustainability and private food governance. 
Advocates of private governance often argue that it can effectively and efficiently contribute 
to the provision of public goods in areas where governments are unwilling and unable to do 
so. Critical views, however, have pointed out that the impact of private food governance on 
sustainable development is highly ambivalent (Clapp 1998, King and Lennox 2000). This also 
applies to private food governance, where previous studies have shown that private standards 
may be able to improve food safety in some aspects and address selected environmental 
problems, while more fundamental environmental aspects as well as the issues of social 
equity and sustainable incomes tend to be ignored if not worsened (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and 
Arentsen 2009). 
Against this background, we clearly need to identify the determinants of an effective 
contribution of private food governance to agrifood sustainability. Under what conditions can 
this contribution occur? An answer to this question will allows us to better decide how likely 
a positive contribution of private agrifood governance to agrifood sustainability is in specific 
contexts as well as in general. Moreover, such an answer would provide us with better 
insights into how a sustainable agrifood system can be further fostered. 
In this paper, we therefore set out to identify the determinants of the effectiveness of private 
food governance in fostering the sustainability of the global agrifood system. To this end, we 
define effectiveness in terms of the stringency of private food standards. We argue that this 
effectiveness will be a function of external pressure, internal collaborative structures, the 
characteristics of available solutions as well as the size and heterogeneity of the group of 
actors designing and implementing the given private governance institution. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief background on private food 
governance as such. Section three then presents our core argument and identifies and 
operationalizes the independent and dependent variables. In section four, we attempt a first 
empirical illustration of the argument using the GlobalGAP as an example. Section five 
discusses our findings and concludes the paper with a brief outlook on research needs and 
political necessities. 
 
II. Background: Private Food Governance 
Private governance -the rules and institutions developed by private actors to structure and 
direct behavior in a particular issue-area- has proliferated in recent years. Quality assurance 
schemes, certification and labeling programs, private standards and codes of conduct at the 
national and, increasingly transnational levels have spread in different domains, including 
politically sensitive ones (Lock 2001). These novel activities by private actors signify their 
new political role as rule-setters in global governance that goes beyond well-established 
activities such as lobbying and awareness raising. This phenomenon reflects a general trend in 
governance as political capacity and functions have shifted from state to non-state actors in 
the context of globalization and the popularity of neoliberal norms (Graz and Nölke 2007). 
One policy domain where private governance rapidly replaces traditional forms of steering is 
agrifood. Traditionally the domain of governmental and intergovernmental actors, the 
governance of food and agriculture is increasingly being not just influenced, but also 
“created” by private actors. Two sets of actors are of interest in this respect: business actors 
and civil society organizations. Business actors, in particular, food retailers, are emerging as 
key players shaping the agrifood sector on the basis of private standards and the creation of 
own brand products (Lawrence and Burch 2007). Accordingly, retailers have been described 
as the “new food and lifestyle authorities” next to the traditional authorities of government, 
church and professional bodies (Dixon 2007:30). Likewise, producers and their associations 
are also engaged in governance activities in the agrifood sector, albeit to a smaller extent. 
Examples of producer-led governance efforts include the creation of alternative food 
initiatives and organizations dedicated to the promotion of organic agriculture, for instance 
(Morgan et al. 2006). Further, many of the private governance initiatives developed by 
retailers, producers or cooperative arrangements between the two also include the 
participation of civil society organizations. Examples of civil society organizations 
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participating in the governance of agrifood include Oxfam, with a special focus on 
development issues and the World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF), a leading environmental 
conservation organization.  
Private governance initiatives may use different mechanisms to achieve their goals. We can 
currently identify three distinct types of private governance mechanisms in the agrifood 
sector: corporate social responsibility reporting (CSR), codes of conduct (CoC), and private 
standards (see also Fuchs, Kalfagianni, Clapp and Busch forthcoming). Corporate Social 
Responsibility efforts include measures to raise corporate awareness as well as reporting of 
business activities which touch on social, human rights, and environmental themes. The idea 
is that such reporting will foster transparency, and ultimately improve firms’ performance on 
these fronts (Gupta 2010). Codes of conduct can be understood as written guidelines on the 
basis of which companies deal with their workforce, suppliers, state authorities and external 
stakeholders in their host country (Greven 2004: 142). Standards are agreed criteria by which 
a product or a service’s performance, its technical and physical characteristics, and/or the 
process, and conditions, under which it has been produced or delivered, can be assessed 
(Nadvi and Wältring 2002). Standards usually represent the strictest form of private 
governance as they typically require regular internal and external auditing processes and 
include disciplinary penalties and/or rewards. However, some codes of conduct are also 
certifiable. In sum, with these private governance mechanisms, private actors increasingly are 
involved in the design, implementation and enforcement of rules and principles governing the 
global food system at various points in the sector from inputs to production to sale. 
 
III. Conditions for an Effective Contribution of Private Food Governance to Agrifood 
Sustainability 
In exploring determinants of effectiveness we adopt a rational institutionalist perspective 
(Hurd 1999; Jönsson and Tallberg 1998; Scharpf 1997). Specifically, we assume that the 
fundamental units of analysis are utility-maximizing private actors who endorse private 
governance institutions on the basis of self-interest calculations (see also Abott and Snidal 
1998). We argue that the patterns of adoption and support of private rules as well as the 
stringency and strictness of such rules are determined largely by the preferences and 
capacities of private actors. In other words, private actors create and endorse private 
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governance institutions in so far as the latter enable them to pursue their own (common) 
goals.  
Two functions performed by private governance institutions gain the support of private actors 
according to the rationalist perspective: (i) the reduction of transaction and other types of 
costs, and (ii) the provision of reputation and financial benefits. In terms of costs, more 
specifically, private governance institutions are considered pivotal in reducing information 
asymmetries and uncertainty, costs associated with negotiation (i.e. with whom and what to 
discuss, when and in what terms) and costs of enforcement (i.e. establishing the conditions 
and instruments for punishment when a contacted transaction is not completed) (see Cutler, 
Haufler and Ronit 1999). In terms of benefits, rational institutionalist approaches emphasize 
reputation and financial gains as pivotal incentives in endorsing private governance. 
Examples include the payment of less expensive premiums and increased access to capital 
from lending institutions to firms adopting ISO 14000 due to the enhancement of the firms’ 
environmental image to consumers, other firms and investors (Clapp 1998). In a similar note, 
Hedberg and von Malmborg (2003) underline the improved access to banks’ and insurance 
companies’ funds by companies listed under the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index 
(DJSGI).1
Cost and benefit calculations might differ for different actors. Characteristics such as position 
in the market, vulnerability to NGO campaigns, sector characteristics, cultural origin, 
proximity to consumers but also a genuine concern for social and environmental improvement 
within senior management are factors which affect firms’ decisions to adopt voluntary 
regulation (Courville 2003; Fuchs 2006). In the forestry certification, for instance, actors with 
high commercial and/or reputational benefits, such as niche and higher-end producers, appear 
more likely to adopt private voluntary programs in relation to low cost operators (Auld et al. 
2008; Marx and Cuypers 2010). Similar observations are made for the certification of coffee 
and fisheries where “good quality” producers and suppliers usually situated in countries with 
well regulated and controlled environments appear to have higher incentives to adopt 
voluntary programs (Gulbrandsen 2010; Muradian and Pelupessy 2005).  
  
                                                          
1 Of course, business actors are not the only ones engaged in private governance. Civil society organizations but 
also public actors are often part of these arrangements. Regarding civil society (and/or public) actors 
participating in private governance arrangements, rational institutionalist approaches point out that positive 
perceptions about goal attainment, e.g. sustainability, constitute incentives for the mobilisation of support even if 
such goals are narrowly defined and might not address fundamental critiques or concerns (see also Cashore 
2002). Our focus in this paper, however, lies specifically with business actors.  
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In sum, the rationalist perspective emphasises the self-interest of private actors as the 
foundation of private governance. This paper draws on this theoretical context in exploring 
the conditions for effective contribution of private food governance to agrifood sustainability. 
Moreover, the paper complements the rationalist perspective by underlying the significance of 
learning and education processes for the fostering of effective private governance.  
Defining and Explaining Effectiveness 
We define effectiveness in terms of the ability of a private food governance institution to 
improve the sustainability of the agrifood system. We further argue that this ability is 
reflected in the stringency of private food standards, in other words the extent to which the 
standards entail strict prescriptions for environmental and social conduct. Such prescriptions 
can be reflected in clear and verifiable/measurable targets, ambitious targets, monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms (including the aspects of third party auditing and the public 
accessibility of reports) and the comprehensiveness of the sustainability dimensions addressed 
by the standards. Sustainability dimensions include different types of environmental (input, 
output, and preservation), social (farmer incomes, labor standards, gender issues), and animal 
welfare aspects.  
We argue that the effectiveness of private food governance is likely to be a function of 
external pressure, internal collaboration, the characteristics of the available solutions as well 
as the interaction between the stringency of a standard and its uptake. External pressure may 
arise due to the visibility of the initiative, the visibility of actors in the initiative or the 
visibility of a problem. We operationalize the visibility of the initiative or actors in it via their 
size (for the initiative: membership and market coverage; for the actors: workforce and 
turnover), the existence of previous scandals or NGO campaigns targeting the standard as 
such or relevant actors in it, and the proximity to consumers, i.e. the retail end of products 
cycles. Moreover, we consider the home of actors in the initiative, as Northern/Western 
consumers have a larger track record of boycotts and political consumerism. We 
operationalize the visibility of the problem via its media uptake and/or its presence on the 
political agenda of governmental or intergovernmental actors as well as large NGOs.  
Next to external pressure, we argue that internal collaborative aspects are likely to influence 
the stringency and uptake of an initiative. Internal collaboration refers especially to the type of 
involvement of civil society actors in the private governance institution. Here we ask, who 
gave the initial impulse for its creation, whether civil society actors participate in the 
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governing boards of the institutions and in what function (observer status, decision making 
power) and with what degree of potential influence (minor, equal, major share of votes).2
We further argue that the availability of solutions to a given problem will affect the stringency 
of a private governance institution. After all, it is much easier for actors to agree on a stringent 
standard, when cheap solutions, either technological or organizational, are available. If instead 
systemic changes would be needed to solve a problem, a level of stringency fostering such 
changes is much less likely.  Finally, the stringency and up take of a standard are likely to 
interact. Thus, the stringency of a standard is likely to be a function of the size and 
heterogeneity of the group designing and adopting the standard.  
 
Moreover, we explore the existence of processes fostering learning and best practice transfer.  
In sum, we argue that the following relationships exist (see Table 1 for a summary of the 
operationalization of the different variables): 
 
Stringency = External pressure+ internal collaboration + availability of solutions + size and 
heterogeneity of membership 
 
In the next section, we illustrate these “hypotheses” using the GlobalGAP as an example. We 
will focus on our core variables of interest: external pressure and internal collaboration, in 
particular, and neglect the other (”control”) variables at this point. While discussing the case 
of the GlobalGAP, we will also identify the variables more easily assessed and those which 
would require more in-depth research in the form of a larger research project.  
 
                                                          
2 Public actors may also be involved in public-private governance institutions, but their impact on the 
stringency and uptake of the standard cannot be predicted as easily, due to the potential for rent-seeking and 
capture of public interests by private ones. In the cases studied in this paper, public actors were not present, 
moreover. 
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Table 1. Variables and their Operationalization  
Variable First Level of 
Operationalization 
Second Level of 
Operationalization 
Third Level of 
Operationalization 
Stringency 
Targets clear and verifiable/ measurable ambitiousness 
Comprehensiveness 
environmental 
input 
output 
conservation  
social 
farmer incomes 
labor standards 
gender issues 
animal welfare 
Compliance 
monitoring mechanisms 
sanctioning mechanisms 
third-party auditing 
public accessibility of reports 
learning mechanisms 
External Pressure 
visibility of initiative 
size 
scandal/NGO campaign 
consumer segment 
visibility of participating 
actors (esp. TNCs) 
size turnover workforce 
scandals/NGO campaigns 
consumer segment 
Northern homebase 
visibility of problem media uptake on political agenda(s) 
Internal Collaboration 
initiative taken by 
participation of civil 
society 
status not given/observer status/voting power 
degree of voting power none/minor/equal/dominant 
Characteristics of 
available solutions availability of solutions 
technological solutions 
available 
costs of technological 
solutions 
need for systemic change 
Membership in 
Initiative 
size 
heterogeneity 
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IV. Empirical Illustration: The GlobalGap 
The GlobalGAP is a private sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certification of 
agricultural products around the globe. The standard (first known as EurepGAP) was initiated 
in 1997 by retailers belonging to the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP). It aims 
to establish one standard for Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) with different product 
applications capable of fitting to the whole range of global conventional agricultural products. 
GlobalGAP is a pre-farm-gate standard, which means that the certificate covers the processing 
of the certified product from farm inputs like feed or seedlings and all the farming activities 
until the product leaves the farm. Moreover, it is a business-to-business label not directly 
visible to consumers.  
To apply the standard for one product, a series of documents is needed. These include the 
General Regulations, the Control Points and Compliance Criteria (CPCC) Protocol and the 
Checklist. The general regulations set out the rules by which the standard is administered. The 
CPCC Protocol is the standard with which farmers must comply and which are audited to 
verify compliance. Checklists replicate the control points and are used by farmers to fulfil the 
annual internal audit requirement and also form the basis of the farmers’ external audit. The 
most important checklist is the one used for inspecting producers, which contains all the 
Control Points. It must be used during inspections by the Certification Board and can also be 
used by the producer/group when performing self-assessments. This checklist is divided into 
41 “major musts”, 122 “minor musts” as well as 91 recommendations (“shoulds”). For major 
musts 100% compliance is compulsory, whereas for minor musts 95%. Shoulds have the 
status of recommendations that must be inspected by certification bodies, but are not a 
prerequisite for the granting of a GlobalGAP certificate. The status of standards is relevant in 
relation to the sanctions that are available in case of non-compliance (van der Grijp 2010).3
GlobalGAP membership consists of three groups: retailers and food service members, 
suppliers and associate members (see Table 2). Membership has varied during the years, with 
new members joining in and some dropping out (see also van der Grijp 2010). At the moment, 
the geographic coverage of the standard is universal. Europe, however, clearly dominates in 
all three categories. Especially in the retail sector it represents almost 85 percent of the 
  
                                                          
3 Other checklists include the Quality Management Systems Checklist used for auditing producer group Quality 
Management Systems (QMS) and the Benchmarking Cross-Reference Checklist (BMCL) or the Approved 
Modified Checklist (AMC) used by applicant scheme owners applying for benchmarking against GlobalGAP to 
show equivalence.  
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members. In the other two categories, the percentage of European presence is slightly lower, 
with 67 percent of the supplier members and 57 percent of the associate members. In total, 
Europe represents 66 percent of total GlobalGAP membership.4
 
  
Table 2. Membership of GlobalGAP 2010 
Continent Retailer and  
Food Service 
member 
Supplier5 Associate member      
member 
Total 
Africa 
Asia 
Australia and New Zealand 
Europe 
Middle East 
North America 
Latin America 
Total 
1 
1 
0 
39 
0 
5 
0 
46 
12 
10 
3 
112 
3 
10 
16 
166 
10 
14 
3 
66 
2 
10 
11 
116 
23 
25 
6 
217 
5 
25 
27 
328 
Source:www2.gobalgap.org/members (16.12.10) 
 
Assessing and Explaining Stringency 
The GlobalGAP’s stringency changed over time with a trend towards the softening of the 
standard (van der Grijp 2010). Today, the standard sets very detailed qualitative targets and 
has institutionalized compliance and sanctioning mechanisms. Moreover, the standard seems 
to be quite comprehensive, at first glance. A closer look, however, reveals a different picture. 
So let us discuss the state of affairs in some detail.  
If we assess stringency in terms of targets, we find that the GlobalGAP standard prescribes a 
long list of rather detailed qualitative targets. These appear mostly clear as well and, thus, 
relatively easy to verify in the auditing process. When it comes to the ambitiousness of the 
targets, however, the standard’s stringency becomes questionable. The qualitative targets 
introduced by GlobalGAP focus predominantly on communication and recording. 
Quantitative targets, however, would allow for a measurement of performance beyond such 
requirements, i.e. not just demand the documentation of pesticide use but also set limits to it. 
In that sense, quantitative targets can demonstrate more clearly departure from past 
performance and achievement of demanding goals. Clearly, quantitative targets are not always 
                                                          
4 These percentages are lower than they were in 2009, however. See Kalfagianni and Fuchs, forthcoming.  
5 Suppliers can apply both as individuals and as groups 
http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/Membership/100615_GLOBALGAP-Membership-Package-EUR.pdf 
(15.12.10) 
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appropriate and therefore not always preferable to qualitative ones. In contexts allowing for 
quantitative targets, however, we would argue that a provision of such targets tends to 
demonstrate a higher degree of ambitiousness of the standard. With respect to GlobalGAP, the 
predominately qualitative nature of its targets even in easily quantifiable aspects such as 
pesticide use and emissions reduction, illustrates a lack of ambition, in our view.  
At the same time, a number of challenges for the assessment of the ambitiousness of targets 
become clear, however. First, it becomes obvious that a thorough assessment of ambitiousness 
would require a broad range of expert interviews for better evaluation and thus would require 
a larger research project. Expert views, for instance, would be needed on the question of what 
is necessary, feasible and under what conditions to assess ambitiousness of standard 
presecriptions. Secondly, the case of GlobalGAP reveals the difficulty of assessing 
ambitiousness in a global context. Some of the standard’s elements seem easy to achieve for 
Northern industrialized farmers, while they may appear highly ambitious for small farmers in 
the South. 
Evaluating stringency in terms of the comprehensiveness of the standard, i.e. its attention to 
different dimensions of sustainability, we find that the GlobalGAP appears comprehensive at 
first sight, addressing food safety/animal health, environmental and social aspects. However, 
the relevance of the different dimensions differs. While hygiene as well as animal related 
aspects such as stocking density are ”major musts”, most environmental and social issues are 
relegated to the status of “minor musts” if not “shoulds”.6 Moreover, fundamental social 
sustainability challenges such as farmer incomes and gender issues are excluded.7
When turning to stringency with regards to compliance and sanctioning mechanisms, finally, 
we find that the GlobalGAP overall appears to have rather strict compliance methods 
consisting of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms as well as third-party auditing. 
Specifically, the scheme is controlled annually by 130 GlobalGAP approved Certification 
Bodies (CBs) supervised by an independent surveillance body, the Integrity Surveillance 
Committee. Internal self-assessment is also possible and must be carried out at least once a 
 
                                                          
6 Environmental inputs, such as use of fertilizer and irrigation, are targeted by the standard but considered “minor 
musts”. Outputs include one “major must”, related to the clearance of farm and premises of litter and waste to 
avoid establishing a breeding ground for pests and diseases which could result in a food safety risk. In the 
conservation category, a number of requirements exist but are almost all “recommendations”, except for one 
“minor must” regarding the establishment of a management of wildlife and conservation plan for the enterprise 
that acknowledges the impact of farming activities on the environment. 
7 GRASP (GlobalGAP Risk Assessment on Social Practices), a recently introduced module which covers a 
broader range of social issues, including children rights, legal status of employees, working hours etc. is 
completely voluntary and, therefore, not required for GlobalGAP certification. 
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year under the responsibility of the producer. “Unscheduled” Surveillance Inspections of 
minimum 10% of all certified producers per annum are carried out (see also below).  
There are two types of GlobalGAP violation of rules: non-compliance and non-conformance. 
Non-compliance occurs when a control point in the checklist is not fulfilled according to the 
compliance criteria. Non-conformance occurs when a rule that is necessary for obtaining the 
certificate is infringed. For all types of non-conformance a warning is issued first, which 
allows for correction in a time period negotiated between the producer and the CB (maximum 
28 days). If the cause of sanction is not resolved within the time period set, a suspension is 
imposed. During the period of suspension, the producer is prevented from using the 
GlobalGAP logo. The suspension can be lifted when there is sufficient evidence of corrective 
action. Finally, a cancellation of the contract is issued when the CB finds evidence of fraud 
and/or lack of trust to comply with GlobalGAP requirements. A cancellation results in the 
total prohibition of the use of logo or any device related to GlobalGAP. A producer that has 
received a cancellation cannot be accepted back to GlobalGAP within 12 months.  
The role of the compliance and sanctioning mechanisms is limited by three constraints, 
however. First, the categories of “minor must” and mostly “shoulds” already allow a 
considerable degree of non-compliance. Secondly, information on certification assessments, 
audit reports, and especially the specific instances of non-compliance is not publicly 
accessible. Thirdly, “unscheduled” visits are still announced 48 hours in advance and there is 
only a 10% chance of receiving such a visit.8
To sum up, GlobalGAP is a relatively comprehensive standard with diverse levels of 
stringency. The implementation requirements differ for different issues with animal welfare 
being the strictest and environmental conservation the weakest categories. What explains 
these observations?  
 
Looking at external pressure, two factors appear to have played an important role. First, 
GlobalGAP emerged in the mid-1990s in a period where food safety concerns were mounting 
as a result of the BSE crisis, while environmental and social issues were also starting to 
capture the attention of an increasingly aware consumer segment. In comparison, however, 
food safety and the realization that one can actually die from the consumption of 
contaminated products has attracted more attention by the media, politicians and the general 
                                                          
8 Compared to a 20% chance in the case of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), for instance. 
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public and continues to dominate public discourse today.9 Moreover, health epidemics can be 
proven much more costly for businesses in relation to environmental degradation, for 
instance. In terms of our argument, then, we would expect the higher stringency of 
GlobalGAP elements related to food safety and public health concerns, which we found 
above.10
Second, while GlobalGAP is not visible to consumers it is visible among the food chain 
actors, civil society, governments and experts. This is enhanced by the fact that important 
market actors have endorsed the initiative from its inception until today. While it is difficult to 
provide an evaluation of collective market share of GlobalGAP members, indicatively, we can 
say that from the producer side, some of the biggest agricultural companies, e.g. Del Monte, 
Cargill, Frosta, participate in the initiative. Likewise, the leading global retailers and food 
outlets with large turnovers, store numbers and workforces, are also represented. These 
include Walmart with USD$ 405 billion net sales in 2009, 8,400 stores in 15 countries around 
the world, and a workforce of 2 million people;
  
11 Ahold with total sales of €28 billion in 
2009, 2,909 stores, 206,000 employees;12 Carrefour group with net sales €86 billion in 2009, 
15, 661 stores and the 7th employer worldwide in the private sector in 2009;13 and, Tesco with 
59 billion pounds in 2009. It is the third largest grocery in the world with 4, 331 stores and 
employing 470,000 people.14
Such visibility has attracted scrutiny of the standard and at times created pressure for higher 
stringency. The following example illustrates this point. In 2006, Greenpeace issued a report 
revealing illegal pesticides and minimal risk levels for hazardous substances (MRL) 
exceedance on fruits and vegetables in German supermarkets members of GlobalGAP, e.g. 
 Moreover, Marks and Spencer and the MacDonald’s corporation 
are members of the GlobalGAP.  
                                                          
9The most recently reported food safety incident is the dioxin animal feed scare in January 2011which shut down 
more than 4.700 German farms. See  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12133361 (07.01.11). A larger 
research project could support such arguments with a systematic discourse analysis, of course.  
10 This discussion also reveals a challenge with respect to the overall research design, however. Here, we identify 
the (visibility of) the problem post-hoc and, in consequence, focus only on those problems that have received at 
least some visibility. In principle, we would need to identify the range of relevant problems first, via literature 
searches and expert interviews, in order to then identify their visibility and try to link that to the stringency of 
corresponding elements of the GlobalGAP standard. The same challenge applies to the control variable of 
availability of solutions, by the way, as well as to the identification of the presence of (clear and measurable as 
well as ambitious) targets of the standard. 
11 http://walmartstores.com/sites/annualreport/2010/financial_highlights.aspx (15.01.11) 
12 http://www.annualreport2009.ahold.com/documents/reports/Ahold_AR_2009.pdf (16.12.10) 
13http://www.carrefour.com/docroot/groupe/C4com/Pieces_jointes/Assemblee_generale/RFI_VGB_BAT_def_v
e.pdf (16.12.10) 
14 http://www.tescoplc.com/annualreport09/abouttesco/financial_highlights/  (15.12.10) 
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REWE, Edeka, Kaisers.15 In response to these revelations, GlobalGAP upgraded 3 CPCC 
requirements from “minor” to “major musts” and introduced an Integrated Pest Management 
Toolbox (checklist and document that give guidance to producers, advisors, certifiers).16 
Observers warn, however, that in cases where stringency requires technical changes that 
prove costly for the farmers (e.g. use of low chemical but more expensive pesticides) and in 
the absence of premium payments for the implementation of such rules, violations cannot be 
ruled out.17
With respect to the role of internal collaboration in influencing the stringency of the standard, 
we can note the following. As mentioned above, the GlobalGAP was created by European 
Retailers and is highly business dominated. Specifically, the GlobalGAP is a business 
standard shared equally by producers and retailers. Decisions are taken by the Board with 
elected representatives from both groups while civil society organizations are excluded from 
decision-making. The latter can participate in consultative roles in the annual meetings, 
however. In addition, GlobalGAP provides the opportunity to interested parties to participate 
freely in public consultations regarding revisions of the standard on the web. These 
mechanisms are important in that they provide opportunities for mutual learning and 
knowledge transfer between the parties. We cannot easily judge, however, the extent to which 
the GlobalGAP Board makes use of the views exchanged in such forums in practice.  
  
Given these collaborative characteristics, our argument would lead us to expect that the 
GlobalGAP is not very stringent. In consequence, the absence of clear and measurable targets, 
and the relegation of most environmental and social issues to “minor musts” and “should,” 
again, should not come as a surprise. A larger degree of decision-making power of 
environmental and social NGOs in the GlobalGAP governance mechanisms would likely have 
led to a different outcome.  
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we identified likely determinants of the effectiveness of private food governance 
for agrifood sustainability and illustrated the application of our argument using the 
GlobalGAP as an example. We argued that the effectiveness of private food governance is 
reflected in the stringency of the respective standards. Moreover, we postulated that 
                                                          
15http://www.greenpeace.de/themen/chemie/pestizide_lebensmittel/detail/artikel/essen_ohne_pestizide-1/ 
(18.12.10) 
16 www.globalgap.org/.../101007_Bolckmans_GLOBALGAP_Summit_London.pdf (18.12.10) 
17 http://www.biocontrol.ca/pdf/Bio13EN-FinalRev.pdf (20.12.10) 
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stringency is a function of external pressure and internal collaborative structures (as well as 
the characteristics of available solutions and the size and heterogeneity of the group designing 
and adopting the standard). In our empirical illustration, we found that the expected relations 
between dependent and independent variables were largely supported. External pressure 
particularly stemming from the visibility of the members participating in the initiatives 
promises to be influential in rethinking targets and enforcing sanctions to a certain extent. 
Likewise, our inquiry suggests that internal collaboration has been influential and reflects the 
interests of respective actors in the targets set.  
There are some limits to our analysis that need to be acknowledged. For example, one may 
argue that our definition of effectiveness via stringency captures only part of the picture. In 
our approach to effectiveness, we assume that a standard’s impact on agrifood sustainability is 
correlated with the actual prescriptions for conduct made by the standard as well as their 
enforcement. Critics may claim that this is not necessarily the case. Thus, actors may adopt 
weak standards, but be pushed to major changes in behavior via learning processes, i.e. on a 
voluntary rather than mandatory basis. We do address the presence of mechanisms fostering 
learning among the independent variables in our argument, of course. Nevertheless, one could 
argue that irrespective of the presence of institutionalized mechanisms learning may occur 
and that we do not consider it sufficiently among our measures of effectiveness, i.e. the 
dependent variables. Two potential arguments exist against the claim that we underestimate 
the existence of learning as a measure of effectiveness. First, if such learning processes did 
indeed occur among a large share of standard takers, it is highly likely that the standard’s 
target would be improved in turn. After all, the supporters and adopters of private governance 
institutions tend to use them as an instrument for communicating their achievements and a 
more stringent standard would allow for better image shaping. In this case, the effectiveness 
of the standard, even if initially achieved via learning processes, should still be reflected in its 
stringency. We do not capture the outperformance of the standard by individual companies 
via stringency, of course, but would argue that those individual companies cannot reflect the 
standard’s impact on agrifood sustainability as such. Secondly, numerous standards with 
varying degrees of stringency exist by now in many areas of the agrifood system. If a 
company did indeed greatly outperform a given standard due to learning processes after a 
while, it is similarly likely that this company would adopt an additional, more stringent 
standard. Again, this would allow a better communication of achievements and thus reaping 
of benefits of the standard in terms of self-advertisement. In this case, the effectiveness of the 
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standard would show in the following up-take of more stringent standards by the relevant 
actors. This potential process was not part of our analysis and therefore would require further 
investigation for us to be able to reject this potential effectiveness of the given standard via 
learning processes with confidence. 
In addition, further research will have to address standard uptake as an additional element 
influencing the overall effectiveness of a private governance institution. After all, the most 
stringent standard will have little effect on the pursuit of sustainable development if it is only 
adopted by a tiny share of the relevant market. Moreover, stringency and uptake are likely to 
interact. Standard up take is likely to be a function of its stringency, as actors can more easily 
achieve compliance with weaker standards than with stringent ones.18
In terms of political needs, the analysis has shown that private governance may entail 
desirable contributions to sustainability governance only under certain conditions and can 
therefore not be a panacea for sustainability. In consequence, there is a need for greater 
involvement by public actors. At the very least, public actors such as states and 
intergovernmental organizations can try to foster some of the conditions for effective private 
governance. Examples include the creation of external pressure by bringing private initiatives 
under scrutiny and fostering greater awareness in society. Public actors can also facilitate the 
 As we suggested above, 
stringency, in turn, is likely to be a function of the size and heterogeneity of the group 
designing and adopting the standard. In the case of the GlobalGAP, we also find indicators of 
such an interaction between stringency and uptake. A large and heterogeneous membership 
appears to come comes at a cost. The stringency of the standard dropped as participation 
broadened, especially to actors beyond the Northern sphere. The causal nature of the 
relationship requires more detailed inquiry. At first sight, it appears that the standard was 
intentionally softened to allow for broader membership. However, new members may also 
have demanded the softening after joining the standard. Moreover, certain types of actors may 
have been pushing for a softening of the standard. The participation of big market players 
with large supply needs can create pressure for relaxing the stringency of standards due to 
production constraints. This has occurred in other private initiatives, such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), where the participation of big retailers led to the introduction of 
varying levels of stringency in the FSC due to the inability to meet the market demand of their 
supply chains (van Waarden 2010). 
                                                          
18 Of course, a standard may also be so weak that actors would not even want to adopt it. Thus, we may find a 
somewhat ambivalent relationship between stringency and up take here. 
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uptake of stringent standards by introducing appropriate financial incentives, such as state 
contributions to the costs of implementation particularly for the financially weak. We 
acknowledge, however, that in the current circumstances such as a scenario is very unlikely. 
Simultaneously, public actors can try to create a “race to the top” by setting minimum 
environmental and social standards for global food supply chains. Again, we are not very 
optimistic that this might happen any time soon. In any case, our analysis indicates that 
market based instruments will almost always face tradeoffs between broader uptake/larger 
market share vs. higher stringency. As such, it is unrealistic to rely on them as the core 
strategy in the pursuit of the transformations required for an environmentally and socially 
sustainable food system.  
References  
Abott, K.W. and D. Snidal. 1998. Why States Act trough Formal International Organizations. 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32.  
Auld G., L. H. Gulbrandsen and C, L. McDermott. 2008. Certification Schemes and the 
Impacts on Forests and Forestry. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 33: 
187-211. 
Cashore, B. 2002. Legitimacy and the Privatisation of Environmental Governance: How Non-
State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority. 
Governance 15(4): 503-529.  
Chasek, P., D. L. Downie and J.W. Brown 2006: Effective environmental regimes, obstacles 
and opportunities, in: Global environmental politics, 4th edition, Westview Press, 197-
232. 
Clapp, J. 1998. The privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the 
developing world. Global Governance 4: 295-316.  
Courville, S. 2003. Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic 
Governance? Law and Policy 25(3): 269-297.  
Cutler, A.C., V. Haufler and T. Porter. 1999. Private Authority and International Affairs. New 
York: SUNY Press.  
Dixon, J. 2007. “Supermarkets as New Food Authorities.” In Burch and Lawrence (eds.). 
Supermarkets and Agrifood Supply Chains. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Fuchs, D., A. Kalfagianni and T. Havinga. 2009. Actors in Private Food Governance: The 
Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multistakeholder Initiatives with Civil Society 
Participation. Agriculture and Human Values. DOI: 10.1007/s10460-009-9236-3. 
Fuchs, D. 2006. Transnational Corporations and Global Governance: The Effectiveness of 
Private Governance. In Stefan Schirm (ed.), Globalization. State of the Art of Research 
and Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Fuchs, D., A. Kalfagianni, J. Clapp and L. Busch. Forthcoming. Introduction to Symposium- 
Private Food Governance: Values, Shortcomings and Alternatives. Agriculture and 
Human Values. 
Graz J.C. and A. Nölke. 2008. Transnational Private Governance and its Limits. London: 
Routledge.  
Greven, T. 2004. “Private, Staatliche und Überstaatliche Interventionen zur Verankerung von 
Arbeitnehmerrechten.” In: Hans Bass and Steffen Melchers (eds.): Neue Instrumente 
zur Sozialen und Ökologischen Gestaltung der Globalisierung: Codes of Conduct, 
Sozialklauseln, nachhaltige Investmentfonds, Münster/Hamburg/Berlin: 139-171. 
17 
 
Gupta, A. 2010. Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: A Coming of Age?. 
Global Environmental Politics 10(3): 1-9.  
Gulbrandsen, L. 2010. Transnational Environmental Governance: The Emergence and Effects 
of the Certification of Forests and Fisheries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Hale, A. 2000. What hope for ‘ethical’ trade in the globalised garment industry? Antipode 
32(4): 349-356. 
Hale, A. and L.M. Shaw 2001. Women workers and the promise of ethical trade in the 
globalised garment industry: A serious beginning? Antipode 33(3): 510-530. 
Hedberg, C.J. and F. von Malmborg. 2003. The global reporting initiative and corporate 
sustainability reporting in Swedish companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management 10: 153-164.  
Hughes, Alex. 2001. Multi-stakeholder approaches to ethical trade: Towards a reorganisation 
of UK retailer’s global supply chains? Journal of Economic Geography 1: 421-437. 
Hurd, I. 1999. Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International Organisation 
53(2): 379-408.  
Jönsson, C. And J. Tallberg. 1998. Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining. European 
Journal of International Relations 4(4): 371-408.  
Lawrence, G. and D. Burch (eds.). 2007. Supermarkets and Agrifood Supply Chains. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Lock, P. 2001. Sicherheit a la carte? Entstaatlichung, Gewaltmärkte und die Privatisierung des 
staatlichen Gewaltmonopols, In: Tanja Brühl, Tobias Debiel, Brigitte Hamm, Hartwig 
Hummel und Jens Martens (Hg.). Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik, Verlag J.H.W. 
Dietz Nachfolger: Bonn, S. 200-231.  
Kalfagianni, A. and D. Fuchs. The GlobalGAP. Forthcoming. In: Ananya Reed,  Darryl Reed 
and Peter Utting  (eds). Business, Non-State Regulation and Development, London: 
Routledge. 
Marx, A. and D. Cuypers. 2010. Forest Certification as a Global Environmental Governance 
Tool: What is the Macro-Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council? Regulation 
and Governance 4: 408-434.   
Mitchell, R. B. 2002. A Quantitative Approach to Evaluating International Environmental 
Regimes. Global Environmental Politics. 2(4): 58-83. 
Morgan, K., T. Marsden, and J. Murdoch. 2006. Worlds of Food. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Muradian, R. and W. Pelupessy. 2005. Governing the coffee chain: the role of voluntary 
regulatory systems. World Development 33(12): 2029-2044.  
Nadvi, K., Wältring, F., 2002. Making Sense of Global Standards. INEF Report 58/2002. 
INEF-University of Duisburg, Duisburg. 
Scharpf, W.F. 1997. Games Real Actors Play. Colorado: Westview Press.  
Schaller, S. 2007. The democratic legitimacy of private governance: An analysis of the 
Ethical Trading Initiative. INEF Report 91/2007, Institute for Development and Peace, 
University of Duisburg-Essen. 
Van der Grijp, N. 2010. Regulating Pesticide Risk Reduction: The Practice and Dynamics of 
Legal Pluralism. Amsterdam: Vrije University Press.  
Van Waarden, F. 2010. Governing Global Commons: Public-Private Protection of Fish and 
Forests. Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance. Working Paper No 17. June 
2010. http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp17.pdf (06.01.11).  
 
